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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-2-19.6 give the

arresting officer authority to take appellant's driver's license
in conjunction with an alleged city ordinance violation or only
in conjunction with an alleged violation of Utah Code Ann. 1953,
§41-6.44?
2.

May a penalty be imposed before conviction?

3.

May an arrest be made on mere suspicion and

not probable cause?
4.

Is an arrest illegal if made on probable cause

based on illegally obtained evidence?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal stems from a drunk driving case wherein
the appellant was charged with having violated a city ordinance.
Yet, his driver's license was suspended for having violated a
state statute.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
These proceedings now before this court involve only
the matter of a per se hearing before the respondent and not the
issue of the companion drunk driving case.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER TRIBUNALS
The appellant was afforded an administrative per se
hearing before Hearing Officer LaMar Smith of the office of the
respondent under Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-2-19.6 to determine if
-1-

the appellant's driver's license should be suspended on the
ground that the arresting officer believed the appellant had
been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44.
The respondent suspended the appellant's driver's
license for a period of 4 months effective June 2, 1985.
That order was appealed and affirmed by the lower court.
Both orders are now before this court on this appeal.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS FOR REVIEW
At about 7:28 p.m. on the 2nd day of May, 1985 (T.8),
the arresting officer received a call from his dispatcher that a
citizen (appellant's wife) had reported that there was an intoxicated person coming down 18th South in a silver Lincoln automobile (T.9).
The arresting officer saw the appellant driving the
somewhat described vehicle (color and make) traveling westbound
on 1800 South at about 350 West in Bountiful, Utah (T.4).

He

observed nothing illegal which would have caused him to write a
ticket (T.4 and T.10).

Neither did his companion officer (T.13).

The only reason he pulled him over was the dispatcher's
call (T.10 and T.13).

It was not until later, after he smelled

the odor of alcohol and observed bloodshot eyes, that he had
reason to believe the appellant was under the influence of alcohol.
The arresting officer did not form his opinion that the
appellant was driving while under the influence of alcohol until
-2-

after the field tests.
The appellant was then arrested for "DUI .08", in
violation of Bountiful City Code No. 8-4-501 (Citation No.
024674), not Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44, as provided for
under Utah Code Ann. 1953, §§41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT OF THE CASE
Utah Code Ann0 1953, §41-2-19.6 is unconstitutional
because it imposes a criminal penalty before conviction.
Even if constitutional, it should be strictly applied
only as

to a charge under Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44 and not

a city ordinance.
American Fork City v. Cosgrove, Utah, 701 P.2d 1069
(1985), cannot be applied retroactively.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT DENIED APPELLANT CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW BY ITS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS ORDER OF SUSPENSION.
Before the respondent can rely on Utah Code Ann. 1953,
§41-2-19.6 as authority for its order of suspension, the arresting
officer must have reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was
in violation of Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44; and, therefore, at
the time of arrest, take the appellant's driver's license and
issue him a temporary license as the first step toward the administrative per se hearing and ultimate order of suspension.
-3-

The appellant was not even arrested for having violated
Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44. The only applicable test for the
officer having had reason to believe the appellant should be
arrested for

lf

DUI .08" was whether or not he had violated

Bountiful City Code No. 8-4-501.
Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-2-19.6 does not give the
arresting officer authority to take the appellant's license in
conjunction with an alleged city ordinance violation; instead,
only in conjunction with an alleged violation of Utah Code Ann.
1953, §41-6-44.
Grants of powers to cities are strictly construed to
the exclusion of implied powers not reasonably necessary in carrying out the pruposes of the express powers granted.

(Layton

City v. Seth, Utah, 578 P.2d 828 (1978), citing Nasfell v. Ogden
City, Utah, 249 P.2d 507, 508 (1952).)
Without the express statutory authority to suspend a
driver's license on the ground that the arresting officer had
reason to believe the driver was in violation of a city ordinance,
the respondent's order of suspension was unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious, in violation of due process and equal protection of the law under United States Const., Amends, V and XIV;
and Utah Const., Art. I, §7.
POINT II
UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, §41-2-19.6 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY IMPOSING PENALTY
BEFORE CONVICTION.
.4.

Assuming without admitting that Utah Code Ann. 1953,
§41-6-19.6 is statutory authority for the reaspondentfs order of
suspension, it is, nevertheless, unconstitutional in that it
imposes the same driverfs license penalty as if convicted of
drunk driving even before conviction.

(See State v. Neely and

State v. Belt, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, filed September 26, 1985,
citing United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 662 (7th Cir. 1926),
wherein it was held that "no one shall be required to suffer
imprisonment for crime before determination of his case in the
court of last resort.11)
In the instant case, if the order of suspension were
upheld, the appellant would have suffered for a crime (drunk
driving) for which he had not yet been tried, nor finally convicted
after app eal.

In fact, he would have so suffered even if he had

not even been charged with drunk driving.

All Utah Code Ann.

1953, §41-2-19.6 requires is only that the arresting officer has
reason to believe the driver was driving while under the influence
of alcohol.
Such action would constitute a presumption of guilt
rather than the constitutional right to the presumption of innocence.

(See Nasfell, supra.)
POINT III
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF
LAW WERE DENIED BY ILLEGAL ARREST
MADE ON MERE SUSPICION AND NOT
PROBABLE CAUSE.
-5-

The arresting officer admitted the sole reason for stopping the appellant was because of the dispatcher's call (T.10,
T.13, and T.14), which was based on double hearsay evidence from
a third person.
This sole reason is evidenced by the hearing officer's
verbatim question and the arresting officer's verbatim answer:
Question (T.13 and T.14):
Okay, I'm, I'm at a little, ah, I have,
I, I've got in the back of my mind,
I'm wondering, ah, why you stopped.
Was it solely because of the dispatcher's
call? Why you stopped this individual?
Ah . ..
(Emphasis added.)
Answer (T.14):
The, ah, to be on the lookout, we did
watch for the person because of the
color, yes.
(Emphasis added.)
Mere suspicion is not enough to constitute probable
cause for arrest without a warrant.

(Mallory v. U.S., 166 F.2d

557 (6th Cir. 1948).
Further, an investigative stop or detention predicated
on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is also unlawful.

Such arrest

remains unlawful even though the officer was acting in complete
good faith.

(People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3rd 577, 159 Cal.

Rptr. 191 (1979).)
All the arresting officer had in the instant case was
the hearsay rumor from the third person to the dispatcher to the
-6-

arresting officer.
This does not meet the level of required probable cause
for a lawful arrest.

Nor does it meet the level of required

probable cause for a lawful order of suspension.
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF
LAW WERE DENIED BY ILLEGAL ARREST
MADE ON PROBABLE CAUSE BASED ON
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE.
The illegally obtained evidence is the results of the
field sobriety tests, which were the alleged basis for the arrest,
and the results of the intoxilyzer, which were considered by the
hearing officer to determine the sole issue at the hearing, i.e.,
did the arresting officer have reason to believe the appellant
had violated Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44, before he took his
driver's license at the time of arrest.
At the time of arrest (May 2, 1985), at the time of the
taking of the appellantfs driver's license before the hearing
(May 2, 1985), and at the time of the respondent's order of suspension (June 2, 1985), Hansen v. Owens, Utah, 619 P.2d 315
(1980), was the law of the State of Utah.

There it was held that

an accused could not be compelled to perform any affirmative acts
which could be used as "evidence" against him.

All would concede

that field sobriety tests and breath tests would constitute
affirmative acts.

Therefore, the results of both would timely

have been inadmissible in a criminal case of drunk driving against
-7-

the appellant.
It is conceded that argument can be made that the
Implied Consent Law, Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44.10, as it
applies to refusal, has civil application only.

However, Utah

Code Ann. 1953, §41-2-19.6, the alleged authority for the order
of suspension, referring to Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44, has
criminal application as applied to drunk driving.
In the instant case, the appellant submitted to the
intoxilyzer test.

Otherwise, he would have had his driver's

license revoked for a year.

So, the only ground for the respon-

dent's order of suspension was the issue of probable cause for
drunk driving, a criminal charge.
Therefore, the respondent cannot hide behind the facade
of civil procedure when in fact criminal sanctions are imposed,
the suspension of driver's license on probable cause, rather than
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is recognized that this court overruled Hans en, supra,
by its decision in American Fork City v. Cosgrove, Utah, 701 P.2d
1069 ( 1985).

There it was decided there was no distinction between

the self-incrimination clause of the federal constitution, which
pertains only to testimonial evidence, and our state constitution
which previously pertained to all types of evidence.
Nevertheless, American Fork City! supra, was not, nor
could not be, made retroactive.
Consequently, the appellant had the constitutional right
-8-

not to be compelled to take the field sobriety tests or the
intoxilyzer test.

The arresting officer did not so advise him,

so he could not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waive
those rights.
CONCLUSION
Any one, and especially all four, of the foregoing
points, as related to the facts of the instant case, would dictate
that

the respondent^ order of suspension be reversed and the

appellant^ driver's license reinstated.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is hereby requested under Category No. 13.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

<S^f day of June, 1986.

PHIL L. HANSEN
800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2467
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

«n- /

day of June, 1986,

I caused four (4) copies of Brief of Appellant to be served on
the Office of the Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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PHIL L. HANSEN
-9- Attorney for Appellant
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
IN AND FOR THE

County of Davis, State of Utah
BEN A. KIRSLING,
Plaintiff,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Defendant.

]
]1
'1

RULING ON APPEAL
Civil No. 37545

This case came to this court as an appeal from the decision of the Drivers License Services hearing officer. Oral
argument on the appeal was heard on October 22, 1985, with
Phil L. Hansen appearing for Ben A. Kirsling and Bruce M. Hale
appearing for Driver License Services. After oral argument,
the court took the case under advisement to give Mr. Hale time
to file a brief. The court now rules on the case.
This case is an appeal from a hearing officer of Drivers
License Services. The hearing officer found that Mr. Kirsling
had violated U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 in that a police officer found
that he was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol. This court does not find the decision of the hearing officer to be arbitrary or capricious and affirms the decision of suspension of license.
I will not restate the facts. They are sufficiently set
out in the documents in the file and have been highlighted by
counsel.
Mr. Kirsling first argues that he was arrested for violation of the Bountiful City DUI law and that the suspension of
license found in U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 applies only to arrests for
DUI under U.C.A. 41-6-44. This court believes that U.C.A.
41-6-43 and U.C.A. 41-6-16 authorizes cities to pass DUI laws
not inconsistent with state law. This court assumes Bountiful
City has done so, since that ordinance has not been challenged
here. U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 then is appropriate for both state statute and city ordinance.

-2Second, Mr. Kirsling claims U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 is punitive
in nature and imposes penalties before conviction of a crime.
The Supreme Court has ruled many times that a drivers license
is a privilege and not a right and that an action involving
the suspension or revocation of that license is a civil proceeding and not a criminal prosecution.
Third, Mr. Kirsling claims the arrest was made on mere
suspicion and not probable cause. The facts do not bear this
out. A citizen had complained. The police had a right and aduty to investigate. Part of the investigation involved stopping the defendant's vehicle. The police were not required to
ignore the citizen's complaint simply because they lacked sufficient personal evidence. After stopping the defendant, police
obtained sufficient evidence to justify the arrest.
Lastly, Mr. Kirsling claims the intoxilyzer test was an
infringement of his right against self-incrimination. First,
Mr. Kirsling voluntarily took the test. Second, the Utah
Supreme Court ruled in American Fork City vs. Crosgrove, filed
June 4, 1985, that a breath test requirement does not violate
either the federal or state constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination.
The action of the hearing officer is affirmed. The suspension of Mr. Kirsling1s drivers license was appropriate.
Mr. Hale is directed to draw a formal order in conformity
to this decision.
Dated November 7, 198 5.
BY THE COURT:
/

JUDC
Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a tri/e and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Phil L. Hansen, 800
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and Bruce M. Hale,
Room 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on November

DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472)
Attorney General
BRUCE M. HALE (#1298)
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
Room 23 6 S t a t e C a p i t o l
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114
Telephone: 533-76 06

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEN A. KIRSLING,
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

Petitioner,
ys.

FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief,
Driver License Services,
Department of Public Safety,
State of Utah,

Case No. 37545
Judge Douglas Cornaby

Respondent.

The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r having come b e f o r e the Court
p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-20 on October 2 2 , 1 9 8 5 , and t h e
p a r t i e s b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , the Court makes t h e
f o l l o w i n g F i n d i n g s and C o n c l u s i o n s based upon t h e r e c o r d and
arguments.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The Court finds t h a t there i s evidence of substance

in the record t h a t shows t h a t the p e t i t i o n e r received an
t

f

opportunity for a hearing, was not prejudiced, and the hearing
examiner was not arbitrary or capricious.
2.

The practical and legal effect of the prior

computerized printed order did not practically or legally effect
or prejudice the rights of the petitioner.

Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
now makes its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes thatr there being no prejudice

or arbitrariness or capriciousness, the petition should be
dismissed.
2.

The Court finds that U.C.A. § 41-6-43 and U.C.A. §

41-6-16 authorizes cities to pass DUI laws not inconsistent with
state law.

This Court assumes Bountiful City has done so, since

that ordinance has not been challenged here.

U.C.A. § 41-2-19.6

then is appropriate for both state statute and city ordinance.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED that the
petition is dismissed.
DATED this

A

-"^X^-*-*^^—
day of

fy p^^^CJo-X-r*-

jJ po^L^-

, 1985.

w^^^JL^

HONORABLE DOUGLAS CORNABY
District Court Judge

41-M9

Motor Vehicles

revoke the license of any resident of this state upon
receiving notice of the conviction of that person in
another state of an offense committed there which,
if committed in this state, would be grounds for the
suspension or revocation of the license of an
operator. The department is also authorized, upon
receiving a record of the conviction in this state of a
nonresident driver of a motor vehicle of any offense
under the motor vehicle laws of this state to
forward a certified copy of the record to the motor
vehicle administrator in the state where the person
convicted is a resident.
(4) vThe department is authorized to suspend or
revoke the license of any nonresident to operate a
motor vehicle in this state for any cause for which
the license of a resident operator may be suspended
or revoked, and any nonresident who operates a
motor vehicle upon a highway when his license has
been suspended or revoked by the department is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
(5) The department may not suspend the license
of any person for a period of more than one year,
except as provided in Subsection (b) of Section 41-218 and Section 41-12-17.5. The department may
suspend the license of a person under Subsection
(l)(g) until he shows satisfactory evidence of comp-,
liance with the terms of the traffic citation. Upon
suspending or revoking a license it shall require that
all license certificates held by the person be surrendered to the department. At the end of the period
of suspension the certificate surrendered shall be
returned to the licensee. In the case of suspension
under Subsection (l)(g) the licensee shall pay an
additional fee of $25 to the department for the
return of the license, as provided in Subsection 41-28(7).
(6) The department may immediately suspend the
license of any person without hearing and without
receiving a record of conviction of the person of
crime whenever the department has reason to
believe that the person's license was issued by the
department through error or fraud or that the
necessary consent for the license has been
withdrawn or is terminated. The procedure upon
suspension is the same as is provided by Subsection
(2), except that after hearing the department shall
either rescind its order of suspension or cancel the
license.
(7) The department, having good cause to believe
that a licensed operator is incompetent or otherwise
not qualified to be licensed, may upon written
notice of at least five days to the licensee require
him to submit to an examination. Upon the conclusion of the examination trie department shall take
action as may be appropriate and may suspend or
revoke the license of the person or permit him to
retain the license, or may issue a license subject to
restriction as permitted under Section 41-2-9.
Refusal or neglect of the licensee to submit to an
examination is grounds for suspension or revocation
of his license*
(8) No report authorized by Section 41-2-12.1
may contain any evidence of a conviction for
speeding on an interstate system in this state if the
conviction was for a speed of less than 71 miles per
hour and did not result in an accident, unless authorized in writing by the individual whose report is
being requested.
(9) The department may suspend the license of a
person when the department has been notified by a
court that the person has outstanding against him
an unpaid fine or an uncompleted restitution requi-

47*
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rement or an outstanding warrant levied by order of!
a court, and the suspension shall remain in effw)
until the department is notified by the court that the
order has been satisfied. No report authorized b)
Section 41-2-12.1 may contain any evidence of tht
suspension.
(10) This section applies to all fines, warrants,Of5
restitution requirements as described in Subsecuot
(9) which are outstanding on or after the effectm
date of this act.
(11) The department may immediately suspetf
the license of a person if it has reason to bdie\»
that the person is the owner of a motor vehicle fa
which a security is required under Chapter 41, Tiu'
31, and has operated the vehicle or permitted it u'
be operated within this state without the secunn
being in effect. The provisions of Sections 41-1.'
17,5 and 41-12-29 regarding the surrender of liccfiK
plates and registration of motor vehicles and (it;
requirement of proof of financial responsibilitj [
apply to persons whose driving privileges m *
suspended under this subsection. If the depanma*
exercises the right of immediate suspension grants •
under this subsection, the notice and hearing pro» t
sions of Subsection (2) apply. A person whoa.
license suspension has been sustained or who*'
license has been revoked by the department und»{
this subsection may file a petition within 30 dip •
after the sustaining of the suspension or the revoa{
tion for a hearing in the matter which, if held, ihal I
be governed by the provisions of Section 41-2-20. \

VTAH C O D E

the results indicate a bl<
or more, or if the offi
based on reasonable grc
termination is correct, t
tn eolation of section 4
administration of the tes
tion shall serve on the p
jurtment, immediate n<
intention to suspend the
to drive. If the officer sc
vm behalf of the departs
driver license or certificat
driver, issue a temporary
K) duys, and supply to tr
approved by the depar
regarding how to obtain
the department. A citati
m«iy, if approved as to
Krve also as the temporary
(4) The peace officer sei
to the department within f
urea and service of the n
along with a copy of the
she offense, and a swor
chemical test results, if any
the officer's determinatioi
violated section 41-6-44, j
regarding the person's viol*
lach such report shall be <
the department and shall be
chief or his equivalent or by
hiin, other than the officer sei
(5) Upon written request
41-2-19.5, Purpose of revocation or suspension for
been issued a 30-day licens
driving under the influence.
The legislature finds and declares that a priram f/ant to the person an op
purpose of the provisions in this code that relate* »<thin 30 days after the dat«
suspension or revocation of a person's license or *>f the 30-day license, but th
privilege to operate a motor vehicle for driving ww *itmn 10 days of the date ol
a blood alcohol content above a certain level a i?f the 30-day license. A he
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug,* More the department in th
combination of alcohol and any drug, or fa «?cit occurred, unless the
refusing to take a chemical test provided for o f«non agree that the hearin
section 41-6-44.10, is safely protecting persons« Nhcr county. The hearing st
roads and highways by quickly removing from then it scope shall cover the issu
roads and highways persons who have shown nV #• (fleer had reasonable grounc
are safety hazards by driving with a blood alcoha la have been operating a mo
content above a certain level or while under tfe ©f* icction 41-6-44, whether
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination e t*brmt to the test, and the
alcohol and any drug or by refusing to take t iDrmcction with a hearing •
chemical test that complies with the requirements a *vly authorized agent may
section 41-6-44.10. ,
m «uy issue subpoenas for the
And the production of relev.
41-2-19.6. Chemical test - Grounds and procedure
t*n« or more members of
for officer's request - Taking license - Report to
***iduct the hearing, and any
department - Procedure by department - Suspensi- faring before any number <
on.
apartment shall be as vali*
(1) When a peace officer has reasonable ground Waring before the full memb
to believe that a person may be violating or h mu After the hearing, the d
violated section 41-6-44 the peace officer may, s carver that the person's licens
connection with his arrest of the person, request fo Nf iuspended or that it not
person to submit to, a chemical test to be admin* utpension, whether orderei
ered in compliance with the standards set forth i •rukr this subsection, shall 1
section 41-6-44.10.
j **>>• beginning on the 31st da
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person pnt] **ie»t. A second or subsequ
to the person's submission to a chemical test the J *AJI subsection shall .be for *
results indicating .08% or more by weight <r **tinning on the 31st day aft
alcohol in the blood shall, and the existence of i Tfce department shall assess
blood alcohol content sufficient to render la Dillon to any fee imposed i
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle cu WU a fee of $25, which mu
result in suspension or revocation of the penes* Cation's driving privilege is
license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle,
*&mnistrative costs, and whici
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test« *i the person obtain* « ..«
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'he results indicate a blood alcohol content of .08<fa
flr more, or if the officer makes a determination,
bsed on reasonable grounds to believe that the determination is correct, that the person is otherwise
a violation of section 41-6-44, the officer directing
idministration of the test or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the department, immediate notice of the department's
mention to suspend the person's privilege or license
o drive. If the officer serves that immediate notice
HI behalf of the department he shall take the Utah
inver license or certificate or permit, if any, o f the
inver, issue a temporary license effective for only
<
'0 days, and supply to the driver, on a form to be
ipproved by the department, basic information
tgarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before
.he department. A citation issued by the officer
ray, if approved as to form by the department,
wvealso as the temporary license.
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall send
o the department within five days after the date of
urest and service o f the notice the person's license
dong with a copy of the citation issued regarding
Jie offense, and a sworn report indicating the
.hemical test results, if any, and any other basis for
it officer's determination that the person has
Tiolated section 41-6-44, and the officer's belief
yarding the person's violation o f section 41-6-44.
C«h such report shall be o n a form approved by
J»e department and shall be endorsed by the police
Aief or his equivalent or by a person authorized by
inn, other than the officer serving the notice.
(5) Upon written request of a person who has
Vcn issued a 30-day license, the department shall
{rant to the person an opportunity to be heard
•ithin 30 days after the date of arrest and issuance
sf the 30-day license, but the request must be made
»nhin 10 days of the date of the arrest and issuance
:f the 30-day license. A hearing, if held, shall be
More the department in the county in which the
irrest occurred, unless the department and the
xrson agree that the hearing may be held in some
tfher county. The hearing shall be documented and
«scope shall cover the issues of whether a peace
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person
o have been operating a motor vehicle in violation
jf section 41-6-44, whether the person refused to
wbmit to the test, and the test results, if any. In
connection with a hearing the department or its
ijiy authorized agent may administer oaths and
•ay issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses
nd the production of relevant books and papers.
Jne or more members of the department may
onduct the hearing, and any decision made after a
earing before any number of the members of the
Apartment shall be as valid as if made after a
karing before the full membership of the departmfflt. After the hearing, the department shall order,
nther that the person's license or privilege to drive
* suspended or that it not be suspended. A first
uspension, whether ordered or not challenged
nder this subsection, shall be for a period of 90
lays, beginning on the 31st day after the date of the
trrest. A second or subsequent suspension under
lis subsection shall be for a period o f 120 days,
^ginning on the 31st day after the date of arrest.
the department shall assess against a person, in
iddition to any fee imposed under subsection 41-2*
ft7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the
arson's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover
iJministrative costs, and which fee shall be canceled
J the person obtains an unappealed departmentT)DE«CO
*ro,Utftb

41-2-23

hearing or court decision that the suspension was
not proper. A person whose license has been
suspended by the department under this subsection
may file a petition within 30 days after the suspension for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall
be governed by the provisions of section 41-2-20.
1*3

41-2-20. Judicial review of license cancellation,
revocation or suspension - Scope of review.
Any person denied a license or whose license has
been canceled, suspended or revoked by the department except where such cancellation or revocation is
mandatory under the provisions of this act unless
the suspension occurred pursuant to section 41-219.6 shall have the right to file a petition within
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in
a court of record in the county wherein such person
shall reside and such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction and it shall be its duty to set the matter
for hearing upon ten days' written notice to the
department. The court's jurisdiction is limited to a
review of the record to determine whether or not
the department's decision was arbitrary or capricious,
mi
41-2-21. New license after revocation.
(1) A n y person whose license has been revoked
under this act shall not be entitled to apply for or
receive any new license until the expiration o f one
year from the date such former license was revoked
or longer as provided in sections 41-2-18 and 41-219. Licenses which have been revoked may not be
renewed, but application for a new license must be
filed as provided in'section 41-2-8, and a license s o
issued shall be subject to all of the provisions of an
original license. The department shall not grant the
license until an investigation of the character,
abilities and habits of the driver has been made to
indicate whether it will be safe to again grant him
the privilege of using the highways.
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose operator's
license to operate a motor vehicle in this state has
been suspended or revoked as provided in this act
shall not operate a motor vehicle in this state under
a license, permit, or registration certificate issued by
any other jurisdiction or otherwise during such suspension or after such revocation until a new license
is obtained when and as permitted under this act.
iw
41-2-22. Owner liable for negligence of minor.
Every owner o f a motor vehicle causing or
knowingly permitting a minor under the age o f
eighteen years to drive such vehicle upon a highway,
and any person w h o gives or furnishes a motor
vehicle to such minor, shall be jointly and severally
liable with such minor for any damages caused 6y
the negligence of such minor in driving such vehicle.
1953

41-2-23. Violation of license provisions.
It shall be unlawful for any person to commit any
of the following acts:
(1) T o display or cause or permit to be displayed
or to have in possession any operator's license
knowing the same to be fictitious or to have been
canceled, revoked, suspended or altered;
(2) T o lend t o , or knowingly permit the use of,
by one not entitled thereto, any operator's license
issued to the person so lending or permitting the use
thereof;
(3) T o display or to represent as one's o w n any
operator's license not issued to the person s o displaying the same; .
(4) T o fail or refuse to surrender to the departm
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or property shall b e consistent with the provisions
of this code which govern those matters.
1W3
41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide - Death occurring
within one year - Penalty - Revocation o f license or
privilege t o drive.
(1) When the death of any person ensues within
one year as a proximate result of injury received by
the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of
the safety of others, the person so operating such
vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide.
(2) Any person convicted of negligent homicide
shall be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail for not more than -one year or by fine of not
less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or by both
such fine and imprisonment.
(3) The department shall revoke the license or
permit to drive and any nonresident operating
privilege of any person convicted of negligent
homicide.
i«3
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or
drug or with high blood alcohol content • Criminal
punishment - Arrest without warrant - Suspension
or revocation of license.
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in
this section for any person with a blood alcohol
content of .08% or greater by weight, or who is
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree which renders the person incapable of safely
driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state. The fact that a
person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does
not constitute a defense against any charge of
violating this section.
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per one
hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
(3)(a) Every person who is convicted the first time
of a violation of Subsection (1) shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than 60 days tior more
than six months, or by a fine of $299, or' by both
the fine and imprisonment. But if the person has
inflicted a bodily injury ' upon another as a
proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a
negligent manner, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine
of not more than $ 1,000.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the
standard of negligence is that of simple negligence,
the failure to exercise that degree of care which an
ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises
under like or similar circumstances.
(4) In addition to the penalties provided for in
Subsection (3), the court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than ten days,
with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the
jail, or require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than two nor
more than ten days and, in addition to the jail
sentence or the work in the community-service work
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol
rehabilitation facility.
(5)(a) Upon a second conviction within five years
after a first conviction under this section or under a
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in
compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court
shall, in addition to the penalties provided for in
502

Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence tf
not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more thu
ten days, with emphasis on serving in the druu
tank of the jail, or require the person to wod is i
community-service work program for not less tu.
ten nor more than 30 days and, in addition to IU
jail sentence or the work in the community-sen a
work program, order the person to participate in u
assessment and educational series at a IICCJIK*'
alcohol rehabilitation facility. The court may, in a
discretion, order the person to obtain treatment k
an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within fnt
years after a second conviction under this section <t
under a local ordinance similar to this secfu
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-4tyt
the court shall, in addition to the penalties prov.itf
for in Subsection (3), impose a mandatory ,u
sentence of not less than 30 nor more than 90&**
with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of h
jail, or require the person to work in a commune
service work project for not less than 30 nor nvi
than 90 days and, in addition to the jail sentence a
work in the community-service work pro&rwv
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcota
rehabilitation facility.
• (c) No portion of any sentence imposed wvto
Subsection (3) may be suspended and the convict**
person is not eligible for parole or probation uf*
any sentence imposed under this section has bm
served. Probation or parole resulting from a COD*
ction. for a violation of this section or a lea
ordinance similar to this section adopted in comp^
ance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not be ttm
nated and the department may not reinstate in
license suspended or revoked as a result of the co*
viction, if it is a second or subsequent convict**
within five years, until the convicted person U
furnished evidence satisfactory to the depanmcti
that all fines and fees, including fees for restitute
and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the p*rv&
have been paid.
(6)(a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and $
that require a sentencing court to order a convtcut
person to participate in an assessment and eduo*
onal series at a licensed alcohol rehabiliuuir
facility, obtain, in the discretion of the cevi
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, a
obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehtf
ilitation facility, or do any combination of tW
things, apply to a conviction for a violation a
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior of feu
under Subsection (7), so as to require the court u
render the same order regarding education ,T
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, a
both, in connection with a first, second, or subtq
uent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualify
as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as he *o*t
render in connection with applying respectively, i*t
first, second, or subsequent conviction requircmcaj
of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5).
(b) For purposes of determining whether i &
nviction under Section 41-6-45 which qualified IU
prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a Ut
second, or subsequent conviction under this sub«
tion, a previous conviction under either Section <.
6-44 or 41-6-45 is deemed a prior conviction. A^
alcohol rehabilitation program and any commune
based or other education program provided for it
this section shall be approved by the Department 4
Social Services,
(7)(a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea ft
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: guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of
I Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted
pursuant to Subsection 4i-6-43(b) in satisfaction
| of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a
| violation of this section, the prosecution shall state
I for the record a factual basis for the plea, including
| whether or not there had been consumption of
| alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
i defendant in connection with the offense. The
| statement shall be an offer of proof of the facts
• which shows whether or not there was consumption
; of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both; by
! the defendant, in connection with the offense.
!
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before
i accepting the plea offered under this subsection of
| the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45
i as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's plea
! of guilty or no contest to a charge of violating
I Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for the
| record that there was consumption of alcohol or
! drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant
j in connection with the offense, the resulting convic! tion is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
j
(c) The court shall notify the department of
! each conviction of Section 41-6-45 which is a prior
! offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest
! a person for a violation of this section when the
officer has probable cause to believe the violation
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if
the officer has probable cause to believe that the j
violation was committed by the person.
j
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall
I suspend for 90 days the operator's license of any |
person convicted for the first time under Subsection ,i
(I), and shall revoke for one year the license of any
person otherwise convicted under this section, |
except that the department may subtract from any i
i suspension period the number of days for which a j
I license was previously suspended under Section 41-219.6 if the previous suspension was based on the I
same occurrence upon which the record of convicti ionisbased.
. in$

for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary.

i9»

41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in
actions for driving under the influence or with a
prohibited blood alcohol content - Weight.
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is
material to prove that.a person was driving or in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or with a blood alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test
or tests as authorized in section 41-6-44.10 shall be
admissible as evidence.
(2) if the chemical test was taken within two
hours of the alleged driving or actual physical
control, the blood* alcohol level of the person at the
time of the alleged driving or actual physical control
shall be presumed to be not less than the level of
the alcohol determined to be in the blood by the
chemical test.
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than two
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical
control, the test result shall be admissible as
evidence of the person's blood alcohol level at the
time of the alleged driving or actual physical
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what
weight shall be given to the result of the test.
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section shall
not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to-a defendant's blood alcohol
level at the time of the alleged driving or actual
physical control.
i«3

41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys authorized to
prosecute for driving while license suspended or
revoked.
Alleged violations of section 41-2-28, which
consist of the person driving while his operator's or
chauffeur's license is suspended or revoked for a
violation of section 41-6-44, a local ordinance
which complies with the requirements of section 416-43, section 41-6-44.10, section 76-5-207, or a
criminal prohibition that the person was charged
with violating as a result of a plea bargain after
having been originally charged with violating one or
more of those sections or ordinances, may be pros41-6-44.2. Repealed.
u u ' ecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as well as by
prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in this
code to prosecute those alleged violations.
i9tt
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis Evidence.
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall
alcohol or drug - Refusal to allow - Warning,
establish standards for the administration and inte- j
report, revocation of license - Court action on revrpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath j
ocation - Person incapable of refusal - Results of
including standards of training.
test available • Who may give test • Evidence.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is
(1) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this
material to prove that a person was driving or in j
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine
influence of alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol
for the purpose of determining whether he was
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as
driving or in actual physical control of a motor,
memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutto prove that the analysis was made and the instruorily prohibited, or while under the influence of
ment used was accurate, according to standards estalcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and
ablished in subsection (1) shall be admissible if:
any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44, so long as
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the
the test is or tests are administered at the direction
regular course of the investigation at or about the of a peace officer having grounds, to believe that
time of the act, condition or event; and
person to have been driving or in actual physical
(b) The source of information from which
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood
made and the method and circumstances of their
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while
preparation were such as to indicate their trustwor- under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combithiness.
nation of alcohol and any drug as detailed in
(3) If the judge finds that the standards establissection 41-6-44. A peace officer shall determine
hed under subsection (1) and the conditions of subwhich of the aforesaid tests shall be administered,
section (2) have been met, there is a presumption
No person who has been requested under this
that the test results are valid and further foundation
fikuwh
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